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ABSTRACT: This article explores the importance of US landpower
and an Indo-American alliance to the growing challenge of China’s
pursuit of hegemony over Asia.

L

andpower is now rarely thought of as the core of American
military might. Current US strategic doctrine emphasizes the
primacy of maritime and airpower.1 In a pivotal speech to the
cadets at the United States Military Academy on February 25, 2011, thenSecretary of Defense Robert M. Gates declared, “Looking ahead . . . the
Army must also confront the reality that the most plausible high-end
scenarios for the US military are primarily naval and air engagements—
whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere.” Indeed, to drive home
the point, Gates asserted “any future defense secretary who advises
the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or in
the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined’ as General
[Douglas] MacArthur so delicately put it.” 2
Yet the Middle Kingdom, a quintessential landpower seeking
to become Asia’s hegemon, is systematically shifting the strategic
calculus in its favor via its audacious Silk Road initiative unveiled
by President Xi Jinping on September 7, 2013. Thus, the only realistic
option to keep the dragon at bay might be to overcome the inhibitions of
current doctrinal orthodoxy and forge a strategic alliance with India—
with landpower as the military centerpiece.3

Advantages of Facing the Dragon Together

A mutual defense treaty between the United States and India
should be perceived as a partnership of equals and must clearly reflect
a shared understanding that both are committed to fighting alongside
the other to safeguard their vital national interests in a conflict
initiated by China. Hypothetically speaking, such a treaty would not
cover territories over which India has asserted sovereignty but does
not exercise administrative control: Azad Kashmir, Gilgit, Baltistan,
and Aksai Chin. Also, the pact would not cover US activities in Japan,
Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, and Thailand, which are
addressed through separate bilateral security agreements. Accordingly,
the proposed bilateral arrangement between India and America would
1      US Department of Defense (DoD), Air-Sea Battle (Washington, DC: Air-Sea Battle
Office, 2013).
2      Robert M. Gates, “Secretary of Defense Speech” (speech, United States Military Academy,
West Point, NY, February 25, 2011).
3      “President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic
Belt with Central Asian Countries,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
September 7, 2013.
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be consistent with the existing US hub-and-spoke security architecture
for Asia. Moreover, the explicit inclusion of the military option would
mirror the strong security commitment incorporated in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization agreement. Accordingly, the operative part
of the treaty might be formulated as follows:
In the event of an armed attack by the People’s Republic of China against
the Republic of India or the United States of America in any area under
Indian or American administration or international waters or airspace in
the Indian or Pacific Ocean regions, the attack shall be considered against
both India and the United States, and consequently both parties agree that,
if such an armed attack occurs, each of them in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations, will assist the party so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other party, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore peace and security.

According to Central Intelligence Agency statistics for 2017, the
combined gross domestic product (GDP) of India, $9.4 trillion, and the
United States, $19.4 trillion, amounted to $28.8 trillion, a comfortable
margin over China’s GDP of $23.1. The combined population of 1.6
billion people for India, 1.3 billion people, and the United States, 0.3
billion people, was also greater than China’s 1.4 billion people during
the period.4 As per a recent estimate, the combined active military force
of an Indo-American alliance would be 2.7 million servicemembers,
with both countries contributing about equally. In comparison, China’s
standing military force is 2.2 million active duty personnel.5
By 2037, according to projections prepared by the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the statistical arm of the US Department
of Energy, such an alliance would have an aggregate GDP of $48.6
trillion (India $22.4 trillion and US $26.2 trillion), while China’s GDP
would remain slightly smaller at $47.4 trillion.6 Moreover, the Indian and
US economies will be approaching parity by 2037 as India’s GDP will
be about 85 percent of America’s GDP. By then, the total population of
the alliance would be about 2 billion people (India 1.6 billion and the
United States 0.4 billion) providing a significant cushion over China’s
population which will have plateaued at 1.4 billion people.7
Crucially, an Indo-American alliance, reflecting its quantitative
and qualitative edge, will be able to threaten China’s energy security
by cutting off the country’s access to oil and gas imports transported
by oceangoing tankers or land-based pipelines. India’s 2,659 kilometer
northern border with China, which stretches from the Kashmir region
in the northwest to the state of Arunachal Pradesh in the northeast,
provides a unique, albeit geographically challenging, pathway for an
air attack and land invasion of China’s western Xinjiang province, the
terminus for energy pipelines from Central Asia (and planned pipelines
4      “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed April 9, 2018, https://www.cia
.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
5      “2018 Military Strength Ranking,” Global Firepower, accessed April 24, 2018, http://www
.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp.
6      “International Energy Outlook 2017, Table: World Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by
Region Expressed in Purchasing Power Parity, 2015–2050,” US Energy Information Administration,
accessed April 9, 2018.
7      “International Energy Outlook 2017, Table: World Population by Region, 2015–2050,” US
Energy Information Administration, accessed April 9, 2018.
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from Iran via Pakistan). Indeed, India, by virtue of its long border with
China as well as its vast strategic depth, is the only option for the United
States to use landpower to counterattack the Middle Kingdom’s weakest
militarily points—Tibet and Xinjiang provinces. Just as important,
India straddles the crucial energy trade’s sea lines of communication
and maritime choke points of the Indian Ocean—from the Strait of
Hormuz in the Persian Gulf and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the Gulf of
Aden to the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits that are the gateways
to the South China Sea and the western Pacific Ocean.
Beijing’s dependence on energy imports is its most important
vulnerability; severing China’s energy lifeline will trigger the collapse
of its economy and immobilize its military. According to EIA estimates
for 2017, Chinese oil imports of 8.2 million barrels per day (bbl/d)
represented about 64 percent of its total oil consumption, and natural gas
imports of 2.6 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) accounted for about 34 percent of
its total natural gas consumption. By 2037, China’s oil imports will rise to
12.2 million bbl/d to meet about 72 percent of its total oil consumption
of 17 million bbl/d, and natural gas imports will increase to 6.4 Tcf to
satisfy about 34 percent of its total gas consumption of 18.9 Tcf.8
Currently, the bulk of Chinese oil and gas imports, which are
purchased primarily from the Middle East and Africa, are transported
along the choke points to various ports along the eastern coast of China.9
In a bid to end the Middle Kingdom’s dependence on seaborne energy
imports, however, Beijing has embarked on an ambitious modern-day
Silk Road project also known as the One Belt, One Road initiative.
Over the next two decades, these land routes, which are beyond
the effective military reach of potential adversaries, will connect
China to friendly major oil and gas producers. Specifically, the energy
security strategy involves expanding existing pipeline systems from
Russia’s Siberian oil and gas fields to Daqing, in northeastern China and
from Kazakhstan’s oil fields and Turkmenistan’s gas fields to Urumqi
in western China’s Xinjiang province. The strategy also proposes
constructing a new energy pipeline system to transport Iranian resources
via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Kashgar, also in Xinjiang
province.10 Within a generation, China will have an independent landbased energy transportation infrastructure.11
With an alliance, the Indian and American naval fleets will have
the combined capability to blockade all five relevant maritime trade
choke points in the Indian Ocean.12 Moreover, the alliance’s land and
8      Calculated imports reflect the difference between consumption and production. See “World
Petroleum and Other Liquids Production,” EIA, acccessed April 9, 2018; “International Energy
Outlook 2017, Table: World Liquids Consumption by Region, 2015–2050,” EIA, accessed April 9,
2018; and “Energy Outlook 2017, Table: World Natural Gas Consumption by Region, 2015–2050,”
EIA, accessed April 9, 2018.
9      “China,” EIA, May 14, 2015.
10     “President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech at Pakistan’s Parliament,” Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, April 21, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn
/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpdbjstjxgsfwbfydnxycxyfldrhyhwlhy60znjnhd/t1257288.shtml.
11      For a skeptical view of China’s alternative pipeline strategy, see US Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic
of China 2017 (Washington, DC: DoD), 43.
12      “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” EIA, July 25, 2017. Indian and American naval forces could
extend their “choke-points” blockade to cover some of Beijing’s maritime silk road ports such as
Gwadar, Pakistan, on the Arabian Sea and Maday Island, Kyaukpyu, Myanmar, on the Bay of Bengal.

98

Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018

air forces will have the capability, if necessary, to attack from India’s
northern border to control a crucial swathe of territory in Tibet and
Xinjiang and to shut down the terminals in Kashgar and Urumqi,
thereby severing China’s land-based access to oil and gas imports from
Iran and Central Asia.
Beijing would then be completely dependent upon Russian
oil and gas supplies delivered to the terminal at Daqing.13 Given its
distant location, the most likely threat to this terminal would be an
intermediate-range ballistic missile launched from northeastern India
that might periodically disrupt the complex, but perhaps not achieve
an extended closure. In any event, China’s capacity to sustain a major
war effort would be seriously, if not fatally, impaired. Faced with such
a credible threat to its energy security, China is unlikely to undertake
actions that would jeopardize the vital interests of the United States
or India.

An Indian Perspective

China is, and will remain, India’s foremost national security threat.
In a serious conflict with China, India is unlikely to prevail, or even manage a draw, singlehandedly. China has seven pathways to launch an armed
attack on India: (1) from Xinjiang through Aksai Chin; (2) from Tibet
across the Sino-Indian border in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand,
Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh; (3) from Xinjiang through Pakistan;
(4) from Tibet through Nepal; (5) from Tibet through Bhutan; (6) from
China through Myanmar; and (7) from China via the South China Sea
through the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits into the Bay of Bengal.
The last five options would involve China violating the sovereignty of
a neighboring country, although Pakistan, China’s ally for over a half
century, may be a willing accomplice.
Undoubtedly, defending India is an enormous undertaking
considering Beijing gets to choose the time, place, and manner of
attack. Only a nuclear attack might be ruled out since India and China
have sufficient second-strike capabilities—via land, sea, and air—for
mutual assured destruction. A nuclear war would not be planned, but it
could be the tragic, unintended consequence of a conventional conflict if
escalatory dynamics are seriously miscalculated and spin out of control.
In 1962, India and China fought an undeclared border war over
competing sovereignty claims with respect to the Aksai Chin area
of Indian administered Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. India was
completely routed. In a second urgent letter to President John F.
Kennedy on November 19, 1962, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru
acknowledged India’s peril and requested American aid: “With the
advance of the Chinese in massive strength, the entire Brahmaputra
Valley is seriously threatened and unless something is done immediately
to stem the tide the whole of Assam, Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland
13      The previously mentioned EIA projections for 2037 forecast Russia’s total oil exports
(calculated as the difference between production and consumption) to be 7.5 million bbl/d and total
natural gas exports to be 11.2 Tcf. With domestic production and 60 percent of Russia’s available
energy exports, which would be 4.5 million bbl/d of oil and 6.7 Tcf of natural gas, China could
meet 55 percent of the nation’s total consumption requirement of 17 million bbl/d of oil and 100
percent of its natural gas consumption requirement of 6.4 Tcf.
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would also pass into Chinese hands.” 14 China, perhaps to preempt the
possibility of a major US military intervention, unilaterally decided to
retain Aksai Chin, whose vital corridor linking Tibet and Xinjiang was
a strategic priority, but withdrew completely from Arunachal Pradesh
without relinquishing its sovereignty claims over the area.
More than half a century later, India continues to suffer a huge
power disparity relative to China. India’s gross domestic product in 2017
was about $9.4 trillion or about 41 percent of China’s GDP of $23.1
trillion, and India’s foreign exchange reserves of $407 billion were a
mere eighth of China’s $3.2 trillion.15 India’s estimated defense spending
as a percentage of GDP in 2016 was 2.5 percent compared to China’s
1.9 percent.16 Moreover, since India’s GDP is only 41 percent of China’s,
to achieve parity in absolute terms Indian defense spending would have
to be 2.4 times the Chinese rate of 1.9 percent, or 4.6 percent. As India
spent 3.9 percent of GDP on defense in 1987, it is reasonable to assume
that India could step up to a 4 percent spending rate on defense over
time.17 India, nevertheless, cannot grow out of its relative power deficit
based upon forecasts for 2037 that indicate India’s GDP of $22.4 trillion
would be only 47 percent of China’s $47.4 trillion.18
New Delhi continually struggles to balance the very real scourges
of malnutrition, disease, and illiteracy that sap the country’s vitality
with the contingent risk to national security posed by China. As early
as November 18, 1950, Prime Minister Nehru grappled with this issue:
“If we really feared an attack [by China] and had to make provision for
it, this would cast an intolerable burden on us, financial and otherwise
. . . there are limits beyond which we cannot go at least for some years.” 19
This agonizing quandary of guns versus butter continues today.
Ultimately, an India determined to defend itself alone faces a
strategic dilemma in confronting a significantly larger, and equally
determined, adversary such as China. The amount of resources India
can mobilize for its defense is limited by the size of its economy, and
once that limit is reached, New Delhi must either accept the hegemony
of the more powerful adversary (and the attendant diminution of India’s
sovereignty) or seek an alliance as an equal partner with a powerful state
that is in competition with the common foe, which would imply sharing
sovereignty with the ally with respect to certain national security issues.20
Since the fundamental strategic calculus is not in New Delhi’s favor,
there is only one realistic solution to India’s strategic dilemma—an
14      Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to President John F. Kennedy, telegram, November
19, 1962, 10:01 p.m., Nehru Correspondence, November 1962, 11–19, JFKNSF-111-016, Papers
of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, National Security Files, Kennedy Presidential Library and
Museum, Boston, MA.
15      “World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency.
16      “Military expenditure (% GDP),” World Bank, accessed March 20, 2019.
17      According to a 2016 Indian public opinion survey, about 63 percent were in favor
of increasing defense expenditures. See Bruce Stokes, “India and Modi: The Honeymoon
Continues,” Pew Research Center, September 19, 2016, http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/09/19
/india-and-modi-the-honeymoon-continues/.
18      “World Gross Domestic Product (GDP),” EIA.
19      “The History of Sino-Indian Relations and the Border Dispute between the Two Nations
(5),” Resurgent India, March 23, 2015.
20      Crafting hub-and-spoke bilateral security arrangements with smaller Asian states such as
Japan, Australia, Vietnam, and Singapore as an alternative to an Indo-American alliance will not
materially change India’s adverse security calculus relative to China.
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alliance with the United States. Arguably, from the time of Prime
Minister Nehru’s brief encounter with President Kennedy in 1962 to
more recent flirtations over the past 25 years of Prime Ministers P.V.
Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, and Narendra
Modi with Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama,
and the warm embrace of current Prime Minister Modi with President
Donald Trump, New Delhi appears to be signaling its willingness to
shed its commitment to nonalignment and strategic autonomy, and
albeit gingerly, enter into an arranged partnership if not marriage.21

Can India Pivot to an Alliance with America?

In his seminal address to a joint session of Congress, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi confidently declared, “Today, our relationship has
overcome the hesitations of history. A strong India-US partnership
can anchor peace, prosperity and stability.” 22 And, in a reassuring sign
of strategic continuity, the joint communiqués, issued at the time of
Prime Minister Modi’s visit with President Obama in June 2016 and
his visit a year later with President Trump, were remarkably similar and
stressed three key themes: freedom of navigation, peaceful settlement of
territorial and maritime disputes, and sharing critical defense technology
with India on the same basis as the closest US allies.23
While a formal Indo-American alliance may be in sight, it is prudent
to consider possible obstacles—such as India’s legacy commitment
to nonalignment and strategic autonomy, doubts about the reliability
of the United States as a strategic partner, and possible adverse
economic consequences of provoking China—of which none are
insurmountable obstacles.
Since gaining independence from Great Britain in 1947, India has
embraced nonalignment as the best way to preserve sovereignty and to
avoid becoming entangled in the bipolar conflicts of the Cold War. As
a practical matter, nonalignment and neutrality became synonymous,
although rhetoric from New Delhi had a decidedly pro-Soviet tilt. With
the end of the Cold War, India adopted a doctrine of nonalignment,
rebranded as strategic autonomy, to reflect a multipolar world.24
Any attempt to sacrifice an Indo-American alliance on the altar of
nonalignment and strategic autonomy is likely to fail. Adherents of this
legacy doctrine would have to demonstrate that India, sans the proposed
alliance, will have the capability to defend itself in a serious nonnuclear
kinetic confrontation with China. Given the significant economic
disadvantage, there is no credible basis for believing New Delhi can
21      For different perspectives on the likely trajectory of US-India relations see Sumit Ganguly,
“Has Modi Truly Changed India’s Foreign Policy?,” Washington Quarterly 40, no. 2 (Summer 2017):
131–43, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2017.1328929; and Rajesh Rajagopalan, “U.S.-India Relations under
President Trump: Promise and Peril,” Asia Policy 24 (July 2017): 39–45, doi:10.1353/asp.2017.0042.
22      “Text of the Prime Minister’s Address to the Joint Session of U.S. Congress,” Hindu, June
8, 2016.
23      “Joint Statement: The United States and India: Enduring Global Partners in the 21st Century,”
White House, June 7, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/07
/joint-statement-united-states-and-india-enduring-global-partners-21st; and “United States and
India: Prosperity through Partnership,” White House, June 26, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov
/the-press-office/2017/06/26/united-states-and-india-prosperity-through-partnership.
24      Siddharth Varadarajan, “Interview: There Is a New China in the NSG and India Needs To
Find a Way To Deal with It,” The Wire, accessed June 30, 2016.
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independently close the chasm between its capability and its intention
to defend itself.
In fact, New Delhi has demonstrated that in extremis it is prepared
to jettison nonalignment and strategic autonomy to safeguard national
security. In 1962, with the Chinese steamroller threatening to overrun
northeast India, Nehru proposed what was effectively an Indo-American
defense pact that provided for an immediate infusion of US military
equipment that included stationing 12 US Air Force squadrons and
establishing a network of American military radar installations in the
country.25 Anticipating an Indo-Pak war, New Delhi signed a security
pact with Moscow on August 9, 1971, that was designed to ensure India
retained a continual flow of Soviet military equipment and, crucially,
deter a possible Chinese intervention.26
While challenging the facts underpinning the decisive advantage
of China in terms of capabilities is difficult, some who cling to
a policy of nonalignment counter that Beijing’s intentions are
benign. These proponents believe China is willing to normalize the
Sino-Indian boundary, with possible minor rectifications, and rhetoric
notwithstanding, the Middle Kingdom does not have irredentist
ambitions toward Arunachal Pradesh—or Southern Tibet in official
Chinese terminology—which lies within India’s border established by
the McMahon Line.27 Indeed, despite sporadic border incidents over
the past 55 years, peace has prevailed along the line of actual control
representing the de facto Sino-Indian border, which testifies to China’s
satisfaction with the status quo. Consequently, an Indo-American
security pact would be perceived by Beijing as a threat to the current
geostrategic status quo.
It is highly unlikely that fear of arousing the otherwise contented
dragon would derail the prospects for an Indo-American alliance. The
security pact would cover only the territory under the administrative
control of India and would not extend to territory that is under Beijing’s
administration but could be claimed by New Delhi. Far from threatening
the status quo along the Sino-Indian border, the pact would deter
China from future attempts to change the de facto border by forcefully
reclaiming Arunachal Pradesh. Current intentions do not preclude
future Chinese irredentism emboldened by India’s continued relative
weakness. Even a successful Indian effort to craft a modus vivendi with
China, while desirable, would not obviate the need for a security pact
with America. In the absence of an Indo-American alliance, and given
the disparity in relative power, India would have to rely on Chinese
forbearance. New Delhi cannot escape the harsh reality of asymmetrical
capabilities by invoking wishful symmetrical intentions.
This debate regarding Beijing’s intentions is not new. When China
proceeded to reclaim Tibet in 1950, the potential of China morphing
25      Nehru, telegram.
26     “Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation,” Ministry of External Affairs (India), accessed
April 9, 2018, http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5139/Treaty+of+.
27      Shortly after the commencement of the Sino-Indian border war, the United States stated
it recognized the McMahon Line as India’s northeastern boundary while remaining silent on
Aksai Chin and the northwestern boundary. This continues to be the American position. See
“Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)
to President Kennedy,” October 26, 1962, document 181, Office of the Historian, accessed April 9,
2018, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d181.
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into a serious threat to India and its sphere of interest had to be
considered. Then the deputy prime minister and home affairs minister,
Vallabhbhai Jhaverbhai “Sardar” Patel, cautioned “even though we
regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as
their friends.” 28 Likewise, Shri Aurobindo, an erstwhile freedom fighter
and revolutionary politician who had long since withdrawn from the
political arena to pursue poetry, philosophy, and yoga, bluntly warned
“the basic significance of Mao’s Tibetan adventure is to advance China’s
frontiers right down to India and stand poised there to strike at the right
moment and with the right strategy.” 29
Tragically, Nehru dismissed the likelihood of a conflict with China
declaring “it is exceedingly unlikely that we may have to face any real
military invasion from the Chinese side, whether in peace or in war, in
the foreseeable future.” 30 His faith in Chinese restraint, purchased with
a decade of conciliatory accommodation of the dragon’s sensitivities,
was disastrous. Having gambled once, New Delhi cannot afford to do
so again in hopes of a more favorable outcome.
Resistance to an alliance between India and the United States
could also emerge from those interested in Sino-Indian trade who may
raise concerns about the potential adverse economic consequences to
India, such as terminated agreements with its largest trading partner.
According to Indian government trade statistics, for the fiscal year
(FY) ending March 2017, total exports and imports with the Middle
Kingdom amounted to $71.5 billion, compared to the total trade with
the United States of $64.5 billion.31 A more sophisticated approach to
assessing the strategic importance of trade relations, and to counter
misguided concerns, would focus on the relative value of Indian exports,
which generate foreign exchange revenues that help fund the country’s
economic growth. Namely, Indian merchandise exports to China during
FY 2017 amounted to $10.2 billion (3.7 percent of total exports) while
exports to the United States were $42.2 billion (15.3 percent of total
exports). Clearly, the United States as an export market is far more
important than China since the adverse economic consequences of
China closing its markets to India would not be significant.
A key driver of New Delhi’s nonalignment policy is the desire to
avoid conflicts, particularly those between more powerful nations that
do not affect India’s vital interests. An Indo-American alliance, according
to some partisans of strategic autonomy, unnecessarily intertwines the
Sino-Indian border dispute with the Sino-American dispute over the
South China Sea. Certainly, the fundamental quid pro quo of such a
security pact would be America’s willingness to fight beside India to
preserve the status quo along the Sino-Indian border in exchange for
India’s willingness to join arms with America to safeguard freedom of
navigation in the South China Sea. This linkage is appropriate because

28      “Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on 7 November 1950,” Friends of
Tibet, accessed April 9, 2018, http://www.friendsoftibet.org/main/sardar.html.
29      Quoted in Sudhir Ghosh, Gandhi’s Emissary (New Delhi: Routledge, 2008), 277.
30      “Sino-Indian Relations,” Resurgent India.
31      “Trade Statistics: Export Import Data Bank (Annual): China PRP” Government of India,
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, accessed April 24, 2018, www.commerce-app.gov/in/eidb
/default.asp.
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it reflects the convergence of vital national interests and recognizes the
security interdependence of both countries.
A strong case can be made that the South China Sea is a vital Indian
national interest. About 80 percent of China’s oil imports, which will
be essential to interdict in the event of a major conflict with China,
currently flow through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea.32
In any major Indian conflict with China, it will be essential to interdict
such energy imports. India cannot sustain an effective naval blockade
without American help.33 Furthermore, New Delhi will need to ensure
that the Chinese Navy does not cross the South China Sea and pass
through the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits to attack India’s east
coast. Again, India will need US assistance to keep the Chinese fleet
confined in home ports. Therefore, it is in India’s vital national interest
that the US Navy operate freely in the South China Sea.
Opponents of an Indo-American alliance could also argue the
United States may be an unreliable partner. They will point out that
Washington placed its interests in forging Sino-American détente to
counter the Soviet Union in 1971 over India’s national security concerns
arising from the civil war between East and West Pakistan. Specifically,
the United States assured Beijing that it would not object to intervention
in support of West Pakistan, sent a US naval task force into the Bay of
Bengal to intimidate India, cut off economic aid to India, and encouraged
the transfer of fighter aircraft from Jordan to West Pakistan.34 Currently,
the United States is embroiled in a dangerous dispute with North Korea
over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program and is seeking Beijing’s help
to pressure the Kim regime. Washington could be lured once again by
the siren song of a grand bargain with Beijing, which could result in
shortchanging India’s vital national interests.
This concern regarding American reliability can be overcome on
the basis that vital national interests will trump commitments to others.
The real question, therefore, is whether the vital national interests of
the United States and India with respect to China are converging in
such a way that a similar threat perception will likely be shared for the
foreseeable future. The joint communiqués of 2016 and 2017 confirm
the strong convergence of interests.
Importantly, in October 2017, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson
addressed concerns about American reliability and commitment to India
by highlighting the centrality of the threat posed by China; reaffirming
the military, geographic, and economic importance of India; recognizing
New Delhi as an equal partner; acknowledging India’s economy will
surpass that of the United States by 2050; and predicting the strategic
partnership between the two countries will endure for a century.35
Furthermore, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
issued by President Trump in December 2017, declares China to be a
32      OSD, Annual Report to Congress, 43.
33      For example, China currently has an overwhelming 4:1 advantage in submarines with 68
compared to India’s 15. The United States has a fleet of 70 submarines. See “2017 Military Strength
Ranking,” Global Firepower.
34     “Memorandum of Conversation,” December 10, 1971, document 274, Office of the Historian,
accessed March 20, 2018, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d274.
35      Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Defining Our Relationship with India for
the Next Century: An Address by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2017).
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national security threat for the first time: “China seeks to displace the
United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its statedriven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor.” Crucially, the
strategy embraces India’s ambitions to be a leading power and enshrines
India as a strategic partner to address China’s threat: “We welcome India’s
emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defense
partner.” To drive home the central importance of India, the strategy
reiterates: “We will deepen our strategic partnership with India and
support its leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout the
broader region.” 36 The bogey of a de facto Sino-American condominium
that would trifle with India’s vital national interests is simply not credible.
The Indian public’s opinion provides grounds for optimism that
an Indo-American alliance is a realistic possibility. According to a Pew
Research Center survey published on November 15, 2017, 49 percent of
Indians have a favorable view of the United States, while only 9 percent
have an unfavorable view and 42 percent have no opinion. By contrast,
only 26 percent have a favorable view of China, 44 percent have an
unfavorable view and 30 percent express no opinion.37 Furthermore, 56
percent consider China’s increasing military power as bad for India while
only 19 percent consider American power to be a negative for India. In
an earlier Pew survey issued in September 2016, about 69 percent were
worried about the Sino-Indian border dispute.38
It is not surprising that over the past quarter century, all Indian prime
ministers, regardless of party, have supported increasingly closer strategic
ties with America.39 Kenneth I. Juster, the current US ambassador to
India, has highlighted this bipartisan consensus: “Significantly, there has
been strong, consistent, and sustained support for this [Indo-American]
partnership from the major parties in each of our countries, across
multiple changes of government.” 40 Indian public opinion, which must
be cultivated and cannot be taken for granted, is unlikely to be a stumbling
block for the prospective alliance.

An Alternative Strategic Calculus?

For the United States, the strategic calculus, absent India, is not very
attractive. Without New Delhi, Washington will suffer a continuing
decline in its strategic position relative to Beijing. America’s longstanding
bilateral alliances with Japan and Australia will not materially change this
adverse strategic calculus. Central Intelligence Agency statistics indicate
the combined GDP of the United States, Japan, and Australia in 2017
totaled $26 trillion slightly ahead of China’s GDP of $23.1 trillion, while
the combined population of the three allies amounted to 475 million
36      Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:
White House, 2017), 25, 46, 50.
37      See Bruce Stokes, Dorothy Manevich, and Hanyu Chwe, “Three Years In, Modi Remains
Very Popular,” Pew Research Center, November 15, 2017, http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/11/15
/india-modi-remains-very-popular-three-years-in/.
38      See Stokes, “India and Modi.”
39      The efforts of prime ministers P.V. Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh of the Indian
National Congress and Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Narendra Modi of the Bharatiya Janata Party to
forge a strong strategic relationship with the United States indicate a favorable bipartisan interest
for such an initiative.
40      “Remarks by Kenneth I. Juster U.S. Ambassador to India: U.S.-India Relations: Building a
Durable Partnership for the 21st Century,” U.S. Embassy & Consulates in India, January 11, 2018,
https://in.usembassy.gov/u-s-india-relations-building-durable-partnership-21st-century/.
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people compared to China’s population of 1.4 billion. Based on recent
Global Firepower estimates, the combined active military force of the
three allies was about 1.6 million servicemembers compared to China’s
military of 2.2 million.
By 2037, however, China has a decisive advantage. Per EIA
projections, the combined GDP of the United States, Japan, and Australia
is expected to be only $33.1 trillion or about 70 percent of China’s GDP
of $47.4 trillion, and the combined population of the trio is expected
to be 528 million people or about 38 percent of China’s population
of 1.4 billion. Moreover, the US alliances with Japan and Australia do
not provide a geostrategic gateway along China’s soft southwestern
underbelly that would support an effective landpower option to counter
China’s Silk Road strategy. While it is likely to take two decades for
China to execute fully its alternative pipelines strategy, it would be a
monumental mistake to gamble on China’s failure.
In 1950–51, American and Chinese military forces took the
measure of each other during the Korean War. Numerically superior
but technologically inferior Chinese troops fought the Americans to
a stalemate. Arguably, the outcome—not winning—was effectively a
military defeat for the United States. Washington grossly underestimated
Beijing’s intentions and capabilities. As a result, Chinese military forces
were able to achieve local battlefield dominance and successfully realize
Beijing’s strategic objectives.
If past is not to be prologue, China must be convinced that it will
be unable to achieve local area dominance along India’s northern border
or in the vital sea lines of communication and maritime choke points
of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Only an Indo-American alliance can
effectively counterbalance, deter, and contain an assertive, resurgent
China bent on becoming Asia’s hegemon.

Implications for US Landpower

Doctrinal orthodoxy rests on the presumption of a static strategic
universe and is invariably disrupted by dynamic reality. Secretary Gates’s
2011 speech reflected the current reality that US adversaries, such as
China, were heavily dependent upon seaborne trade. Consequently, the
central challenge for the US military was to ensure continued control of
the global maritime and air commons and thereby safeguard America’s
role as the sole global power.
China’s response, announced two years later, was to launch its Silk
Road initiative that essentially turns the table on America’s strategic
assumption of the primacy of maritime and airpower by leveraging
the Middle Kingdom’s historic strength as a landpower. If successful,
China’s Silk Road will completely bypass the maritime commons and
render US naval and air supremacy irrelevant within a generation.
Current American military doctrine, given its focus on maritime and
airpower, cannot deal with China’s brilliant landpower counter move.
Rather than doubling down on maritime and airpower, or simply hoping
that China will fail, it is imperative that Washington trump Beijing’s
strategy with a daring decision to restore landpower as the primary
military means to check the Chinese juggernaut.
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An Indo-American strategic alliance incorporates the centrality of
landpower since it is designed to threaten China’s energy security via
a land invasion across India’s northern border into Tibet and Xinjiang
provinces to shut down energy pipeline terminals in Kashgar and
Urumqi. Putting sufficient boots on the ground, and sustaining them to
ensure local area dominance, is the army’s primary competency.
To assume such a Himalayan challenge, the US Army will have to
ensure its troops are ready for combat in an extraordinarily inhospitable
environment: frigid temperatures, ice and snow, rapidly changing weather
conditions, very high altitudes, and treacherous mountains—the domain
of infantry, artillery, and supply logistics. In short, the Army will have
to be prepared to demonstrate that it has the capability—in terms of
manpower, equipment, and training—and the capacity, in partnership
with the Indian Army, to prosecute a major ground war in Asia.41
Entering into a new security agreement that potentially obligates
America to fight another land war in Asia will not be easy. Given China
is expected to be America’s greatest national security threat by 2025, the
next 5–10 years is the likely time frame for establishing a US-India mutual
defense treaty to deal with the ripening Chinese threat. Transforming
a tentative and hesitant relationship into a formal committed alliance
will require strategic patience, persistence, and perseverance.42 Yet,
by leveraging their combined landpower—the crucial missing link—
together with supporting maritime and airpower, the American eagle
and Indian tiger, jointly but perhaps not severally, can continue to keep
the Chinese dragon at bay for the foreseeable future.

41      Joint military exercises such as the armies’ Yudh Abhyas (since 2004) and the navies’ Malabar
(since 2002) are good building blocks for enhancing joint operability.
42      See Hearing to Consider the Nomination of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and Reappointment To Be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, 115th Cong. (September 26, 2017) (statement of General Joseph F. Dunford,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

